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Abstract
We explain why the AEC should perform an audit of the paper Sen-
ate ballots against the published preference data files. We suggest four
different post-election audit methods appropriate for Australian Senate
elections. We have developed prototype code for all of them and tested it
on preference data from the 2016 election.
∗Authors are grouped by institution, in alphabetical order, and then listed in alphabetical
order within each institution.
†Grahame Bowland is a member of the Australian Greens. His contribution to this project
has consisted entirely of help in implementing the Australian Senate counting rules and facil-
itating Bayesian audits using his code. The techniques here are non-political.
‡Andrew Conway is a member of the Secular Party.
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1 Introduction
A vote in the Australian Senate is a list of handwritten numbers indicating
preferences for candidates. Voters typically list about six preferences, but may
list any number from one to more than 200. Ballots are scanned, digitized and
then counted electronically using the Single Transferable Vote (STV) algorithm
[Aus16].
Automating the scanning and counting of Senate votes is a good idea. How-
ever, we need to update our notion of “scrutiny” when so much of the process
is electronic. We suggest that, when the preference data file for a state is pub-
lished, there should be a statistical audit of a random sample of paper ballots.
This should be performed in an open and transparent manner, in front of scru-
tineers.
Election outcomes must be accompanied by evidence that they accurately
reflect the will of the voters. At the very least, the system should be Software
Independent [Riv08].
A voting system is software independent if an undetected change or
error in its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in
an election outcome.
This principle was articulated after security analyses of electronic voting
machines in the USA showed that the systems were insecure [FHF06, KSRW04,
BEH+08, CAt07]. The researchers found opportunities for widespread vote
manipulation that could remain hidden, even from well-intentioned electoral
officials who did their best to secure the systems.
Followup research in Australia has shown election software, like any other
software, to be prone to errors and security problems [HT15, CBNT]. For this
reason, evidence of an accurate Senate outcome needs to be derived directly
from the paper ballots.
Legislation around the scrutiny of the count has not kept pace with the
technology and processes deployed to perform the count. As a result, the scru-
tineering has lost a significant portion of its value. With the adoption of a
new counting process the scrutineering procedures need to be updated to tar-
get different aspects of the system. The current approach might comply with
legislation, but it doesn’t give scrutineers evidence that the output is correct.
This paper suggests four different techniques for auditing the paper Sen-
ate ballots to check the accuracy of the published preference data files. The
techniques vary in their assumptions, the amount of work involved, and the
confidence that can be obtained.
These suggestions might be useful in two contexts:
• if there is a challenge to this year’s Senate outcome,
• as an AEC investigation of options for future elections.
An audit should generate evidence that the election result is accurate, or
detect that there has been a problem, in time for it to be corrected. We hope
that these audits become a standard part of Australian election conduct.
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1.1 Q & A
• Q: Why do post-election audits?
A: to derive confidence in the accuracy of the preference data files, or to
find errors in time to correct them.
• Q: What can a post-election audit tell you about the election?
A: It can tell you with some confidence that the outcome is correct, or
it can tell you that the error rate is high enough to warrant a careful
re-examination of all the ballots.
• Q: Can the conclusion of the audit be wrong?
A: Yes, with small probability an audit can confirm an outcome that is,
in fact, wrong. It can also raise an alarm about a large error rate, even if
the errors do not in fact make the outcome wrong.
• Q: Who does post-election audits now?
A: Many US states require by law, and routinely conduct, post-election
audits of voter-verified paper votes when the tallies are conducted electron-
ically. Exact regulations vary—the best examples are the Risk-Limiting
Audits [BFG+12] conducted by California and Colorado.
• Q: What is needed to do a post-election audit?
A: The audit begins with the electronic list of ballots, and (usually) relies
on being able to retrieve the paper ballot corresponding to a particular
randomly-chosen vote in the file. There must also be time and people to re-
trieve the paper ballots and reconcile them with the preference data file. A
video of random ballot selection is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sdWL8Unz5kM.
• Q: How long does it take? How many ballots must be examined?
A: It depends on the audit method, the level of confidence derived, the
size of the electoral margin and the number of errors in the sample. This
is described carefully below.
• What is the difference between a statistical post-election audit
and a recount?
A: It’s not feasible to do manual recounts; a statistical post-election audit
would provide a comparable way of assessing the accuracy of the outcome.
1.2 Our contribution
This paper describes four suggested approaches to auditing the paper evidence
of Australian Senate votes, each described in more detail in Section 2.
Section 2.1 Bayesian audits [RS12],
Section 2.2 a “negative” audit based on an upper bound on the margin,
Section 2.3 a simple scheme with a fixed sample size,
Section 2.4 a “conditional” risk-limiting audit, which tests one particular al-
ternative election outcome.
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We have prototype code available for completing any of the above kinds
of audit. This would be the first time these sort of auditing steps are being
applied, and so this year’s efforts would be much more “exploratory” in character
than “authoritative”. We hope to be able to perform two or more kinds of audits
on the same samples. However, we do not even know, at the time of writing,
whether any audit will happen at all.
The key objective is to provide evidence that the announced election outcome
is right, or, if it is wrong, to find out early enough to correct it by careful
inspection of the paper evidence.
1.3 Where the Senate count depends on trusting software
This very brief security analysis of the current process is based on documents
on the AEC’s website [AEC16]. The objective of the system is, in principle,
extremely simple: capture the vote preferences from the ballot papers, and then
publish and tally them.
The current implementation results in a number of points of trust, in which
the integrity of the data is not checked by humans and is dependent on the
secure and error-free operation of the software. Whilst internal audit steps are
useful, there are many systematic errors and security problems they would not
detect. We list the three most obvious examples below.
Image Scanning There appears to be no verification that the scanned image
is an accurate representation of the paper ballot. As such, a malicious, or
buggy, component could alter or reuse a scanned image, which would then
be utilised for both the automatic and manual data entry. This would
pass all subsequent scrutiny, whilst not being an accurate representation
of the paper ballot. We understand that scrutineers can ask to see the
paper ballot, but this seems very unlikely to happen if the image is clear
and the preferences match.
Ballot Data Storage Whilst a cryptographic signature is produced at the end
of the scanning and processing stage, and prior to submission to the count-
ing system, this signature is based on whatever is in the database. There
is no verification that the database accurately represents what was pro-
duced by the automatic recognition or the manual operator, nor that it
was the same thing displayed to scrutineers on the screen. An error, or
malicious component, with access to the database could undetectably alter
the contents.
Signature Checking Automatic signature generation is a problem in the pres-
ence of a misbehaving device. There is no restriction on the device creating
signatures on alternative data. Likewise, there appears to be no scrutiny
over the data being sent between the scanning process and the counting
process, particularly, that the sets of data are equal. There appears to
be logging emanating from both services, but no clear description of how
such logs will be reconciled and independently scrutinised.
In summary, there are plenty of opportunities for accidental or deliberate
software problems to cause a discrepancy between the preference files and the
paper votes. This is why the paper ballots should be audited when the preference
files are published.
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1.4 Background on audits
The audit process begins with the electronic data file that describes full pref-
erences for all votes in a state. This file implies a reported election outcome R,
which is a set of winning candidates which we assume to be properly computed
from the preferences in the data file. (Actually we don’t have to assume—we can
check by rerunning the electronic count.) Each line in the data file is a reported
vote—we denote them r1, . . . , rn, where n is the total number of voters in the
state. Each reported vote ri (including blank or informal ones) corresponds to
an actual vote ai expressed on paper, which can be retrieved to check whether
it matches ri. The whole collection of actual votes implies an actual election
outcome A. We want to know whether A = R.
The audit proceeds by retrieving and inspecting a random sample of paper
ballots. A comparison audit chooses random votes from the electronic data
file and compares each one with its corresponding paper ballot. The auditor
records discrepancies between the paper and electronic votes. A ballot polling
audit chooses paper ballots at random and records the votes, without using the
electronic vote data.
Although the security of paper ballot processing is important, it’s indepen-
dent of the audit we describe here. An audit checks whether the electronic
result accurately reflects the paper evidence. Of course if the paper evidence
wasn’t properly secured, that won’t be detected by this process. Our definition
of “correct” is “matching the retained paper votes.”
An election audit is an attempt to test the hypothesis “That the reported
election outcome is incorrect,” that is, that R 6= A. There are two kinds of
wrong answer: an audit may declare that the official election outcome is correct
when in fact it is wrong, or it may declare that the official outcome is wrong
when in fact it is correct. The latter problem is easily solved in simpler contexts
by never declaring an election outcome wrong, but instead declaring that a
full manual recount is required. The first problem, of mistakenly declaring an
election outcome correct when it is not, is the main concern of this paper.
An audit is Risk-limiting [LS12] if it guarantees an upper bound on the
probability of mistakenly declaring a wrong outcome correct. A full manual
recount is risk-limiting, but prohibitively expensive in our setting. None of
the audits suggested in this paper is proven to be risk limiting, however all of
them provide some way of estimating the rate of errors and hence the likelihood
that the announced outcome is wrong. In some cases, the audit may not say
conclusively whether the error rate is large enough to call the election result into
question. In others, we can derive some confidence either that the announced
outcome is correct or that a manual inspection of all ballots is warranted.
1.5 Why auditing the Australian Senate is hard
Election auditing is well understood for US-style first-past-the-post elections
but difficult for complex voting schemes. The Australian Senate uses the Single
Transferable Vote (STV). There are many characteristics that make auditing
challenging:
• It is hard to compute how many votes it takes to change the
outcome. Calculating winning margins for STV is NP-hard in gen-
eral [Xia12], and the parameters of Australian elections (sometimes more
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than 150 candidates) make exact solutions infeasible in practice. There
are not even efficient methods for reliably computing good bounds.
• A full hand count is infeasible, since there are sometimes millions of
votes in one constituency,
• In practice the margins can sometimes be remarkably small. For
example, in Western Australia in 2013 a single lost box of ballots was
found to be enough to change the election outcome. In Tasmania in 2016
there were more than 300,000 votes, but the final seat was determined by
a difference of 141 votes (meaning errors in the interpretation of 71 ballots
might have altered the outcome).
This makes it difficult to use existing post-election auditing methods.
To get an idea of the fiendish complexity of Australian Senate outcomes,
consider the case of the last seat allocated to the State of Victoria in 2013.
Ricky Muir from the Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party won the seat, in
a surprise result that ousted sitting Senator Helen Kroger of the Liberal party.
In the last elimination round (round 291), Muir had 51,758 more votes than
Kroger, and this was generally reported in the media as the amount by which
he won. However, the true margin was less than 3000 (about 0.1%). If Kroger
had persuaded 1294 of her voters, and 1301 of Janet Rice (Greens)’s voters, to
vote instead for Joe Zammit (Australian Fishing and Lifestyle Party), this would
have prevented Zammit from being excluded in count 224. Muir, deprived of
Zammit’s preferences, would have been excluded in the next count, and Kroger
would have won. (Our algorithm for searching for these small margins is de-
scribed in the full version of this paper.)
This change could be made by altering 2595 ballots, in each case swapping
two preferences, none of them first preferences, all below the line. First prefer-
ences are relatively well scrutinised in pollsite processes before dispatch to the
central counting station. Other preferences are not. Also lowering a particu-
lar candidate’s preference wouldn’t usually be expected to help that candidate
(though we are not the first to notice STV’s nonmonotonicity). So the outcome
could have been changed by swapping poorly-scrutinised preferences, half of
which seemed to disadvantage the candidate they actually helped, in far fewer
ballots than generally expected.
2 Overview of available options
This section describes four different proposals and compares them according to
the degree of confidence derived, the amount of auditing required, and other
assumptions they need to make. We have already implemented prototype soft-
ware for running Bayesian Audits (Section 2.1) and computing upper bounds
on the winning margin (Section 2.2). We have tested the code on the AEC’s
full preference data from some states in the 2016 election—results are described
briefly below.
2.1 Bayesian Audits
Rivest and Shen’s “Bayesian audit” [RS12] evaluates the accuracy of an an-
nounced election outcome without needing to know the electoral margin. It
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samples from the posterior distribution over profiles of cast ballots, given a prior
and given a sample of the cast paper ballots (interpreted by hand). It only looks
at a sample of the cast paper ballots—it does not compare the sampled paper
ballots with an electronic interpretation of them.
An profile is a set of ballots. The auditor doesn’t know the profile of cast
(paper) ballots, and so he works with a probability distribution p over possible
such profiles, which summarises everything the auditor belives about what the
profile of cast ballots may be.
The Bayesian audit proceeds in stages. Successive stages consider increas-
ingly larger samples of the cast ballots.
Each stage of the Bayesian audit provides an answer to the question “what is
the probability of various election outcomes (including the announced outcome),
if we were to examine the complete profile of all cast ballots?”
This question is answered by simulating elections on profiles chosen according
to the posterior distribution based on p, and measuring the frequency of each
outcome.
Each audit stage has three phases:
1. audit some randomly chosen paper ballots (that is, obtain their interpre-
tations by a human),
2. update p using Bayes’ Rule,
3. sample from the posterior distribution on profiles determined by p and
determine the election outcome for each; measure the frequency of different
outcomes.
Like any process that uses Bayes’ Rule, choosing a prior is a key part of
the initialization. The suggestion in [RS12] is to allow any political partisan to
choose the prior that most supports their political beliefs. When everyone (who
uses Bayes’ Rule properly) is satisfied that the evidence points to the accuracy of
the announced result, the audit can stop. For example, the auditors could agree
to stop when 95% of simulated election outcomes match the reported outcome.
In the Australian Senate case, we assume that there will be only one apolit-
ical auditing team (though in future candidate-appointed scrutineers could do
the calculations themselves). Hence we suggest a prior that is neutral—if the
announced outcome is correct, this probability distribution will be gradually
corrected towards it.
An alternative, simpler version amounts to a bootstrap, treating the popu-
lation of reported ballots as if it is the (prior) probability distribution of ballots,
and then seeing how often one gets the same result for samples drawn from
that prior. This gives an approximate indication of how much auditing of paper
ballots would be necessary, assuming that the paper ballots were very similar
to the electronic votes. We have run this version of the audit on the Senate
outcome from 2016. Table 1 shows the number of samples needed in the boot-
strapping version, in order to get 95% of trials to match the official outcome.
Tasmania is the closest, and the only one that’s really infeasible: a sample size
of about 250,000 ballots is needed before 95% of trials produce the official out-
come, which is not much better than a complete re-examination of all ballots.
This is hardly surprising given the closeness of the result. Queensland requires
23,000, which is still only a tiny fraction of the total ballots. Apart from that,
all the other states require only a few thousand samples.
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State Number of votes (millions) Audit sample size (thousands)
NSW 4.4 4.6
NT 0.1 1.5
Qld 2.7 23
SA 1.1 3
Tas 0.34 250
Vic 3.5 6
WA 1.4 9
Table 1: Sample sizes for 95% agreement in bootstrap Bayesian Audit.
We suggest a combination of the bootstrapping method with the retrieval
of paper ballots: have a single short partial ballot in favor of each candidate,
combined with an empirical Bayes approach that specifies that only ballots of
the forms already seen in the sample (or the short singleton ballots) may appear
in the posterior distribution.
Although these audits were designed for complex elections, there are sig-
nificant challenges to adapting them to the Australian Senate. Running the
simulations efficiently is challenging when the count itself takes some time to
run. Answers to these challenges are described in the full version of the paper.
2.2 Upper bounds on the margin plus “negative” audits
We have implemented some efficient heuristics for searching for ways to change
the election outcome by altering only a small number of votes—the code is avail-
able at https://github.com/SiliconEconometrics/PublicService. The Kroger/Muir
margin described in the Introduction is an example. We can guarantee that
the solution we find is genuine, i.e. a true way to change the outcome with that
number of ballots, but we can’t guarantee that it is minimal—there might be
an even smaller margin that remains unknown. The algorithm produces a list
of alternative outcomes together with an upper bound on the number of votes
that need to change to produce them.
If the error rate is demonstrably higher than this upper bound on the margin,
then we can be confident it is large enough to change the election result. Of
course, it does not follow that the election result is wrong, especially if the errors
are random rather than systematic or malicious. It means that all the paper
evidence must be inspected.
This allows a “negative audit,” which can allow us to infer with high confi-
dence that the number of errors is high enough.
Suppose there are N ballots in all. Suppose we know that the outcome could
be altered by altering no more than X ballots in all, provided those ballots were
suitably chosen. Suppose we think the true ballot error rate p (ballots with
errors divided by total ballots, no matter how many errors each ballot has) is q,
with qN ≫ X ; that is, we think the error rate is large enough that the outcome
could easily be wrong. Then a modest sample of size n should let us infer with
high confidence that pN > X .
For example, consider the 2016 Tasmanian Senate result, in which the final
margin was 71 out of 339,159 votes (a difference of 141 votes). We can compute
the confidence bounds based on a binomial distribution. A lower 95% confidence
9
bound for p if we find 3 ballots with errors in a sample of size 2500 is about
0.0003. That’s much greater than the error rate of 71/339, 159 = 0.00021 that
would be needed to change the outcome. If we did find errors at about that rate,
it would be strong evidence that a full re-examination of all the paper ballots
is warranted. Code for this and other probability computations in this paper is
available at https://gist.github.com/pbstark/58653bbc26f269d4588ea7cd5b2e12bf.
2.3 Audits of fixed sample size
A much simpler alternative is to take a fixed sample size of paper ballots (e.g.
0.1% of the cast ballots), draw that many ballots at random and examine them
all.
This conveniently puts a “cap” on the number of randomly-chosen paper
ballots to be examined, but the audit results may provide less certainty than an
uncapped audit would provide.
2.3.1 Risk-measuring audits
Assume now that the aim is to try to find confidence that the election outcome is
correct. This audit could quantify the confidence in that assertion, by computing
binomial upper confidence bounds on the overall error rate. The idea is to find
the p-value (or confidence level) that the sample you actually have gives you
that the outcome is right.
Even an error rate of 0.0002, i.e., two ballots with errors per 10,000 ballots,
could have changed the electoral result in Tasmania, depending on the exact
nature of those errors. The sample size required to show that the error rate
is below that threshold—if it is indeed below that threshold—is prohibitively
large. If we take a sample of 1,000 ballots and we find no errors that affect the
71 margin, the measured risk is the chance of seeing no errors if the true error
rate is 0.0002, i.e., (0.0002)0 ∗ (1 − 0.0002)1000 = 81%. If we took a sample of
2,000, the measured risk would be (0.0002)0 ∗ (1 − 0.0002)2000 = 67%.
However, this method might be quite informative for other contests. Manual
inspection of a sample of 1,000 ballots could give 99% confidence that the error
rate is below 0.0046 (46 ballots with errors per 10,000 ballots), if the inspection
finds no errors at all. If it finds one ballot with an error, there would be 99%
confidence that the error rate is below about 0.0066 (66 ballots with errors per
10,000 ballots).
Similarly, manual inspection of a sample of 500 ballots could give 99% con-
fidence that the error rate is below 0.0092 (92 ballots with errors per 10,000
ballots), if the inspection finds no errors at all. If it finds one ballot with an
error, there would be 99% confidence that the error rate is below about 0.0132
(132 ballots with errors per 10,000 ballots).
If more errors are found, this gives a way to estimate the error rate. If it is
large, this would give a strong argument for larger audits in the future.
2.3.2 Fixed-size samples with Bayesian Auditing
We can also derive some partial confidence measures from the given sample.
For example, you could list, for each candidate, the precentage of the time that
candidate was elected across the Bayesian experiments. (Each experiment starts
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with a small urn filled with the 14000 ballots, plus perhaps some prior ballots,
and expands it out to a full-sized profile of 14M ballots with a polya’s urn
method or equivalent. This is for a nationwide election; for the senate the full-
size profiles are the size of each senate district.) Depending on the computation
time involved, we might run say 100 such experiments. So, you might have a
final output that says:
Joe Jones 99.1 %
Bob Smith 96.2 %
Lila Bean 82.1 %
. . .
Rob Meek 2.1 %
Sandy Slip 0.4 %
Sara Tune 0.0 %
Such results are meaningful at a human level, and show what can be reason-
ably concluded from the small sample.
This allows us to have a commitment to a given level of audit effort, rather
than a commitment to a given level of audit assurance, and then give results
that say something about the assurance obtained for that level of effort.
2.4 Conditional Risk Limiting Audits
Back to the Tasmanian 2016 example again. One way to examine the issue
is to consider the particular, most obvious, alternative hypothesis, i.e. that
the correct election result differs only in changing the final tallies of the last
two candidates. If we assume that all the other, earlier, elimination and seating
orders are correct, we can conduct a risk-limiting audit that tests only for the one
particular alternative hypothesis. (Of course, it isn’t truly risk limiting because
it doesn’t limit the risks of other hypotheses.) This may be relevant in a legal
context in which a challenging candidate asserts a particular alternative. This
method would provide evidence that the error rate is small enough to preclude
that alternative (if indeed it is), without considering other alternatives.
This can be run as a ballot-level comparison audit, in which the electronic
ballot record is directly compared with its paper source. When an error is
detected, its impact on the final margin can be quantified (a computationally
infeasible problem when considering all possible alternative outcomes). A risk-
limiting audit could be based on the Kaplan-Markov method from [Sta08]. It
allows the sample to continue to expand if errors are found: that is, it involves
sequential testing. At 1% risk limit, the method requires an initial sample size
of about (10/margin), where the margin is expressed as a fraction of the total
ballots cast. Here, that’s about 0.0002. A risk limit of 5% would require hand
inspection of roughly 16,000 ballots, assuming no errors were found.
2.5 Summary
These four different audit methods could each be conducted on the same dataset.
We would generate the sample by choosing random elements of the official pref-
erence data file, then fetching the corresponding paper ballot. The Bayesian
Audit and the simple capped scheme would then simply treat the paper ballots
as the random sample. The upper-bounds based scheme and the conditional risk
limiting audiit would consider the errors relative to what had been reported.
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There are important details in exactly how the audit is conducted. We
suggest that the auditors not see the electronic vote before they are asked to
digitize the paper—otherwise they are likely to be biased to agree. However,
we also suggest that they are notified in the case of a discrepancy and asked to
double-check their result—this should increase the accuracy of the audit itself.
Details of this process are interesting future work. It is, of course, important
that the audit itself should be software independent.
If the rate of error is high then a high level of auditing is required. With few
or no errors, our best estimates of the necessary sample size for each technique
applied to the Tasmanian 2016 Senate are:
• for Bayesian audits, about 250,000 samples until 95% of trials match the
official outcome,
• for “negative” audits, a sample that found 3 or more errors out of 2500
ballots would give a 95% confidence bound on the error rate (being big
enough),
• a fixed sample size of 500 or 1000, even with no errors, seems unlikely to
be large enough to infer anything meaningful for Tasmania 2016, though
it may be useful for other contexts,
• a conditional risk-limiting audit would require about 16,000 ballots for a
risk limit of 5%, assuming no errors were found.
Most other states would probably be easier to audit as they do not seem to
be as close.
3 Implementation Summary
All the tools necessary for conducting a Bayesian audit of Australian Senate
votes are available as a Python package at https://pypi.python.org/pypi/aus-senate-audit,
with code and instructions at https://github.com/berjc/aus-senate-audit.
Code for searching for small successful manipulations is at https://github.com/SiliconEconometrics/Pub
Code for computing relevant statistical bounds is at https://gist.github.com/pbstark/58653bbc26f269
4 Conclusion
Elections must come with evidence that the results are correct. This work con-
tributes some techniques for producing such evidence for the partly-automated
Australian Senate count.
All of the audits discussed here can be conducted immediately, using code
already available or specifically produced as a prototype for this project.
4.1 Future Work
In the future we could expand the precision with which we record errors and
make inferences about their implications. We are also pursuing an easier user
interface for administering the audit.
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